On the eleventh anniversary of the September 11 terrorist attacks, One World Trade Center steadily progresses toward a late 2013 completion date. The spire on top of the 104-story skyscraper will reach 1,776 feet, a symbolic reference to America’s independence. David Childs of Skidmore, Owings and Merrill, Architect, is the architect for One World Trade Center, and Tishman Construction is the primary contractor. Although reports vary, the final construction cost of the tower will be close to $4 billion. The current images of One World Trade Center are inspiring and an uplifting image on this day of remembrance.
On June 14th, President Obama joined Governor Cuomo, Governor Christie and Mayor Bloomberg to see first-hand the tower’s progress. The President added a personal touch to one of the final steel beams to be installed at the top of the skyscraper by including the following signed message: “We remember We rebuild We come back stronger! Barack Obama.” One World Trade Center will be surrounded by three additional high-rise office buildings and the National September 11 Memorial & Museum.
While the tenth anniversary of 9/11 put the memorial on full display, the 100,000-square-foot museum is currently behind schedule. Delayed by funding, oversight, and financing, construction of the museum came to a halt after the tenth anniversary. On Monday night, however, the 9/11 Memorial and Museum Foundation (chaired by Mayor Bloomberg) and the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey (controlled by Mayors Cuomo and Christie) signed a memorandum of understanding, resolving the outstanding issues. The parties negotiated additional payments from the September 11 foundation, in an attempt to ensure that no additional public funds are needed to complete the National September 11 Memorial & Museum. Originally planned to open today on the eleventh anniversary, the museum is now likely to open at the end of 2013.
When trouble, in the form of adverse changes in financial conditions or the property marketing environment, strikes during the period between construction contract signing and completion of procurement and construction activities, the developer often will have to consider taking the course of action that will maximize value for all stakeholders. Ultimately, it may reluctantly determine that the construction contracts and work should be suspended for some period of time or terminated altogether. Our white paper Shutting Down the Construction Project, updated to include California’s mechanic’s lien laws effective July 1, 2012, outlines significant issues that an owner should consider when suspending or terminating a California commercial construction project.
Things to consider include providing notice of the suspension/termination, if the contract is suspended, keeping the contract and subcontracts in effect, and closing out the claims exposure. Similar principles apply to projects in other states and projects of a residential, industrial or public nature. As becomes quickly apparent, the laws governing these issues are highly technical and often impose short deadlines for compliance, and also pose signfiicant risk to owners and contractors for non-compliance. To learn more about this, click here to our white paper.
Developers got a significant win in California last week when the California Supreme Court held that an arbitration provision contained in a recorded instrument bound a homeowners association, despite the fact that the homeowners association did not exist when the instrument was recorded and thus had no opportunity to negotiate the provision. The opinion can be found here.
In Pinnacle Museum Tower Association v. Pinnacle Market Development (US), LLC (August 16, 2012) 2012 Cal. LEXIS 7665, a homeowners’ association (“HOA”) sued the developer of a mixed-use residential and commercial common interest community, alleging construction defects. Prior to selling any units, the developer had recorded a declaration of covenants, conditions, and restrictions (“CC&R’s”), which provided that the developer, each individual homeowner, and the HOA, all consented to arbitration under the FAA of any construction-related disputes. Each individual homeowner’s purchase agreement specifically noted the homeowner’s acceptance of the CC&R’s, and the arbitration provision in particular. However, pursuant to California law, the HOA was not actually created until the sale of the first unit.
The HOA sued the developer, alleging construction defects, and the developer moved to compel arbitration. The trial court found that the arbitration agreement was substantively and procedurally unconscionable, and refused to enforce it. The appellate court affirmed, concluding that the arbitration provision in the CC&R’s was not sufficient to waive the HOA’s right to a jury trial, and further that it was unconscionable and unenforceable.
The California Supreme Court reversed, holding the arbitration provision enforceable against the HOA. The court found that the CC&R’s were in the nature of a contract, and that since an HOA is bound by law to other provisions in the CC&R’s, to treat the arbitration provision differently would run afoul of U.S. Supreme Court precedent prohibiting the application by states of more onerous requirements to arbitration clauses than are otherwise generally applicable to contract provisions. And, since the HOA’s membership consisted entirely of the individual condominium owners, each of whom agreed to arbitration of construction disputes by agreeing to the CC&R’s, it was not unreasonable to bind the HOA to arbitration to prevent the individual owners from circumventing the CC&R’s by acting through the HOA. Further, although the HOA argued that the arbitration provision was unconscionable because the HOA had no meaningful opportunity to negotiate the provision because it did not yet exist, the court disagreed. The court found that inclusion of the provision was permissible under the applicable statutes, and that the lack of opportunity to negotiate the provision represented a legislative policy choice.
One of John F. Kennedy’s best quotes was noting that “Washington is a city of Southern efficiency and Northern charm.” When it comes to Public Private Partnerships, things have turned around in the last 50 years. The South leads the way in P3’s with Virginia, Florida and Texas being notable standouts. The conventional wisdom has been that strong unions in northern states would continue to fight against more private involvement in state infrastructure. But the pressures of constrained state budgets are proving too strong.
The Olympics are in full swing, with the world’s attention on the playing fields and pools dotting the United Kingdom. But how about the venues themselves, how green are they? The London Organizing Committee planned the Games with a green tint, focusing on sustainable principles for everything from stadium construction, food service, and the use of public transportation. Plus, the large number of preexisting venues around the city (tennis at Wimbledon, for example) made some additional construction unnecessary.
Planning for Green – The Organizing Committee took the forward-thinking step of setting up the London Legacy Development Corporation three years ahead of the Games, which has focused on long-term uses of the Olympic venues after the torch is passed to Russia’s winter Olympics. The Development Corporation’s plans for housing and parks were developed with an eye to rebuilding parts of London, particularly East London. The Organizing Committee even took the extra step of working with the Independent Standards Organization to develop a global standard for sustainable event management, now known as ISO 20121:2012.
Green Building – Venues constructed for the games include a number of innovative green features. The roof of Olympic Stadium, for example, was constructed from unwanted gas pipes from the North Sea and over 40% of the concrete used for construction is made of recycled materials. While the question remains as to whether this much new construction can ever be considered truly sustainable when developed for a single mega-event, the Organizing Committee took great steps to reduce waste. Many Olympic venues that do not have long-term uses were built only to be used for the Games and will then be taken apart and their materials will be reused.
Looks like a tough act to follow for Sochi and Rio.
Illinois and California appellate courts recently issued two policy-holder favorable decisions. In both cases, the trial court had granted summary judgment in favor of the insurance company and denying coverage, and in both cases the trial court decisions were reversed.
In the Illinois case, Patrick Engineering, Inc. v. Old Republic General Insurance Co. — N.E.2d —, 2012 WL 3010344, Ill.App.2 Dist, July 20, 2012 [not yet released for publication], an engineering firm entered into a consulting agreement with an electric utility. As required by the agreement, the engineer procured a CGL policy naming the utility as an additional insured. The policy’s professional services exclusion excluded coverage for property damage “arising out of the rendering or failure to render” engineering services.
While working on a project designed by the engineer, the utility damaged the sewers of a local municipality, which then sued the utility on a negligence theory. The utility tendered its defense to the insurer, which rejected the tender, denying coverage based on the policy’s professional services exclusion. In a subsequent lawsuit filed by the engineer and utility to determine coverage, the insurer argued that because the damage arose out of the engineer’s services, the professional services exclusion operated to bar coverage both for the named insured engineer and the additional insured utility–even though all parties agreed that the utility did not perform any engineering services. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the insurer.
On appeal, the court found coverage by analyzing the interplay of the policy’s additional insured endorsement, professional services exclusion, and separation-of-insureds clause. The additional insured endorsement provided that an “Insured” included the listed additional insured if liability arose in whole or in part out of the engineer’s work. The separation-of-insureds clause provided that the insurance applied separately to each insured. The appellate court agreed with the utility that it could rely on the “arising out of” language in the additional insured endorsement to claim status as an additional insured, and that the separation-of-insureds clause then provided coverage to the utility despite the professional services exclusion because the utility had not performed professional services. In other words, the fact that the named insured performed professional services did not trigger that exclusion for the additional insured.
In the California case, Travelers Property Casualty Co. of America v. Charlotte Russe Holdings, Inc. — Cal.Rptr.3d —, 2012 WL 2356477, 2d App. Dist., June 21, 2012 [ordered published July 13, 2012], a manufacturer of high-end apparel entered into an exclusive sales agreement with a clothing store. The manufacturer subsequently sued the store, alleging that the store’s sale of the high-end apparel at deeply discounted prices harmed the apparel brand.
The store tendered its defense to its insurer under its CGL policy, which provided coverage for both personal and advertising injury, and required defense of any suit seeking damages for those injuries. The personal injury coverage extended to offenses arising out of the business (but not advertising). The advertising injury coverage extended to offense committed in the course of advertising the business, but excluded injuries arising from breach of contract. The personal injury coverage contained no such exclusion. Both provided coverage for claims alleging injury from disparagement of goods.
The insurer declined to either indemnify or defend, on the basis that a reduction in price of a good is not disparagement of that good. The insurer filed a declaratory relief action to determine that it owed no duty to defend or indemnify. In support of its motion for summary judgment, the insurer argued that California law equated disparagement with trade libel, requiring a false statement and resulting loss of business. The trial court found for the insurer.
On appeal, the court found that the allegations of injury to the apparel brand by offering the brand at a low price could reasonably be interpreted as disparagement of that brand, and that therefore the claims were potentially covered by the personal injury coverage of the policy. The court reached this result by noting that California law permitted disparagement by implication, and that disparagement claims were not required to be expressly stated as disparagement or trade libel. The court disagreed with the insurer that a disparagement claim required the allegation of trade libel, but noted that even if it did, the selling of a high-end product at discounted prices could be construed as an implied false statement by the seller that the high-end product was not, in fact, high-end.
Because the court found coverage under personal injury, it avoided deciding whether coverage would have been available under advertising injury, and thus did not reach the potentially thornier issue of whether the breach of contract exclusion would have excluded coverage when no breach of contract was proven since the underlying litigation had settled.
